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Duncan Kennedyt
These  two  papers  illustrate  what to my  mind is  one  of the  most
interesting  and  important  developments  in  legal  scholarship  today,
namely the emergence of a critical labor law theory.  Side  by side, the
papers  also  reveal  a fundamental  cleavage  within  this  new  body  of
work.  For while Lynd and Klare agree  that labor law does not func-
tion  in the working  class'  best interest, they disagree  as to the  form a
critique of liberal legal  ideology should take.
Klare and Lynd both view labor law in the years after World War
II as a mechanism that coopts the working class and defuses class strug-
gle.  There  are  two aspects  of this  analysis, often confused.  First, the
authors  claim that the rules in effect - e.g.,  the rule of Vaca v. SipesI
- have  a coopting and demobilizing  effect on working class militancy,
quite  apart  from  their justifications.  Here  the  implicit  comparison  is
with  other  rules  that might  be  applied  to the  Vaca  facts,  but which
would have different results for class struggle.  Second,  to explain and
justify the rules in force, judges, lawyers, union officials,  managers and
legal scholars  use a  legal  discourse which has its  own ideological  im-
pact.  The arguments,  claims, descriptions,  premises  and other images
and representations  that supposedly justify the rules in force  are false
and incoherent.  Labor law doctrinal discourse thus is best  understood
as lies and errors.  Furthermore, the lies and errors have a bias in favor
of the status  quo.
The  Vaca rule  illustrates  both aspects  of this  analysis.  The rule
itself stultifies class struggle by entrenching union and management bu-
reaucratic power as against the rank and file.  Vaca discourages worker
attacks on management's power by requiring the worker to act through
a union which has been vested with a kind of discretionary disciplinary
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power  that  inevitably  allies  it  with  management.  But  the  industrial
pluralists' justification  for  Vaca, if it  persuades  militants they  should
accept the disciplinary  as opposed to the insurgent conceptualization  of
their labor union, compounds the  evil worked  by the  substantive  out-
come under the rule by making that outcome appear rational and just.
The legal  rules direct the application  of state force  in  support  of
the existing  structures of domination and  illegitimate hierarchy  in the
workplace.  The justifications offered for the rules disguise their repres-
sive function  in the language of industrial peace or workplace democ-
racy.  Yet the irony remains that the working  class itself, directly  and
through  its intelligentsia,  has  been  deeply implicated  in the  develop-
ment of the rules and the elaboration  of the justificatory  ideology.  The
current  situation  must be  understood  as a perversion  of workers'  ac-
complishments  as well as the outcome of outright domination by man-
agement.  Criticism  of labor law  as a demobilizing  ideology  does not
for a moment imply criticism of the struggles that produced the modem
American labor movement.  It does imply criticism of the dissolution of
left labor theory into the prevailing conservative ideology of American
capitalism.
Both of these papers are  concerned with  the coopting and demo-
bilizing effect of the rules of modem labor law, and with the way labor
law as ideology  operates to provide  rationales  for the  course  of anti-
labor decisionmaking under the existing labor statutes.  But their focus
is not on the actual impact of labor law on its victims.  It is  rather on
the preliminary  but essential  claim  that  the justifications  for  the  ex-
isting rules are  false or incoherent  or both, and that they are  false  or
incoherent  with a bias.  The quid pro quo doctrine,  for example, mis-
represents  the character of the arbitration/no  strike bargain,  and mis-
represents  it in a particular  way: by  making worker disarmament look
like  worker victory.
If there is agreement up to this point among the critical labor theo-
rists, it is only up to this point.  For it is here that two  quite strikingly
different  critical  strategies  present  themselves.  The  choice  between
them is fraught  with implications.
One alternative, represented by Staughton Lynd's paper, is to criti-
cize labor law doctrine on the ground that it is false to the basic ideals
and norms of liberal political theory-to argue against  labor law doc-
trine on the ground that  it fails to do what liberal theory  says  all law
should do, namely guarantee people their rights.  The lie of labor law,
then, is that  it pretends  to guarantee  people  their rights  while in  fact
sacrificing  them to the illegitimate interests of management  and union
bureaucracy.  And Lynd can locate, in the industrial pluralist work of
people like Archibald Cox and David Feller, labor law ideologists whoCRITICAL L,4BOR LAW THEORY
don't even  pretend.  They  openly  affirm that labor law  has to  do not
with the rights of individual workers, but with labor peace through the
creation of a viable but limited union counterforce to management.  In
Lynd's view, these ideologists are convicted out of their own mouths of
advocating  tyranny,  and what  we  need  is  a  view  "which  begins and
ends with workers'  rights...
The alternative point of view, represented by Karl Klare's paper, is
that labor law is an instance of the incoherence of liberal theory, and of
its conservative  bias in practice, rather than an instance  of betrayal of
liberal  ideals.  Klare  argues  that industrial pluralist  ideology attempts
to adapt earlier forms of rights theory to modem conditions, and that it
fails because there  exists no coherent  rights theory to be adapted.  We
study  labor  law not  to detect  deviations  from  the line  dictated  by  a
genuine  adherence  to the ideal of workers'  rights, but to demystify all
attempts to justify the status quo by manipulation of the empty  liberal
categories.  For example, Klare points out that coherent reasoning from
liberal premises requires one to be clear whether the entity one is talk-
ing about is public or private, since all kinds of consequences  flow from
the characterization.  But liberal theory can't tell us whether labor un-
ions are public or private.  The theory provides good arguments  either
way, as well as for a hybrid classification.  In consequence, labor ideol-
ogists  can  and  do  manipulate  the  liberal  rhetoric,  switching  unions
back and forth, between public and private,  as legitimation needs vary
from  case to case.3
At first blush, it may seem  that all the advantages  lie with Lynd's
choice of strategy rather than with Klare's.  There  are weighty  advan-
tages to the workers'  rights critique, and weighty disadvantages  to the
outright rejection  of liberal rights theory.  First, Lynd's analysis has  a
unity that Klare's lacks.  Lynd first shows that labor law denies work-
ers'  rights  and  then asks  for development  of a  view that  begins  and
ends with workers'  rights.  Since Klare's  analysis denies  the coherence
of liberal  rights theory,  he cannot generate  a positive program  out  of
his critique.  Critique is just critique:  it frees us of the constraints of the
reified liberal categories like "public"  and "private" but cannot tell us
what to do next.  If "you can't beat something with nothing," and if the
something  we  need  is a  liberal  rights  theory  of a  new  society,  then
Klare's  approach is at best incomplete.
Second, liberal rights rhetoric is ingrained in our political culture,
including  the  political culture  of both the  working class  and the  bu-
reaucracy  that wields decisionmaking power.  We need  the rights slo-
2. Lynd,  Government  Without Rights.- The Labor Law  Vision  of  Archibald  Cox,  4  INDUS.
REL.  LJ.  483, 494  (1981)  (emphasis  added).
3.  See  Klare, supra  note  1,  at 470-73.
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gan to mobilize people to defend their vital interests and human needs;
we need  rights rhetoric as a means to manipulate judges and adminis-
trators into granting through the courts gains the workers are not strong
enough  to win on the shop floor or the picket line.
I  think both  these  points are  well  taken, but  they don't  end  the
argument.  Ultimately, I  agree with Klare's  approach, and think it can
be defended.  First, the argument that there will be bad consequences
for the  left if liberal  rights  theory  loses its plausibility  is a weak one.
The point is that the theory is wrong and incoherent.  This is just true,
as far as I can tell, and no amount of lamenting the consequences of his
fall will put Humpty Dumpty back together again.  Marx and the prag-
matist supporters  of the  American  labor movement  long  ago demon-
strated  the inadequacies of liberal  rights theory.'
Second,  the  left  doesn't  need  a  counter-theory  that  ends  with
rights.  We need utopian thinking, but the short-term, practical and cre-
ative  manner,  rather  than  in  the form  of rationalist  "end-of-history"
deductions  of the ideal  state  of mankind.  It is  desirable  rather than
tragic  that our program  for the future must emerge  dialectically  from
our  past,  rather than  as  a  deduction  from  it.  Even  if the  critique  of
labor law as ideology can do nothing more than free us for this kind of
utopian enterprise, the critique is well worth doing.
Finally, the critique of rights as liberal philosophy does not imply
that the  left  should  abandon  rights  rhetoric  as  a  tool  of political  or-
ganizing or legal argument.  Embedded  in the rights notion is a liberat-
ing  accomplishment  of our  culture:  the  affirmation  of  free  human
subjectivity against  the constraints of group  life, along  with  the para-
doxical countervision of a group life that creates and nurtures individu-
als capable of freedom.  We need to work at the slow transformation of
rights rhetoric, at dereifying  it, rather than  simply junking it.  And on
this plane, it seems to me that Klare and Lynd are once again in com-
plete accord.  They represent the emergence of a new left  intelligentsia
committed at once  to theory and to practice, and to creating  a radical
left world view in an area where once there were only variations on the
theme of legitimation  of the status quo.
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